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Introduction 
This paper deals with the ethical dimensions of action in NieR: Automata (N:A; 
PlatinumGames 2017). I begin by outlining the game, focusing primarily on three themes 
which find their expression on the game’s ludic and narrative levels and making a claim that 
N:A represents an interesting object of study which in many ways challenges our 
understanding of ethics and action in the context of single-player computer games. At the end 
of this section, I also posit the research question guiding the rest of the paper, focused on 
issues of player behavior and ethical value formation. In the second section of the paper, I 
discuss several ways in which action can be defined and structured in single-player computer 
games, with the aim of showing the ways in which N:A limits and guides the behavior of its 
player. In the next section, I introduce Espen Aarseth’s notion of the implied player (Aarseth 
2007) and problematize it from a standpoint of (computer game) ethics. I then propose a 
parallel, complementary concept in relation to ethical and moral values, as opposed to 
instrumental behavior, which I use in tandem with the notion of the implied player to answer 
the driving question behind the paper. 
 
Throughout the paper, I follow an understanding of action as fundamentally intentional, 
forwarded by, among others, Jean-Paul Sartre (1978), Donald Davidson (2002) and Elizabeth 
Anscombe (2000). However, due to the limited scope of the paper, I unfortunately do not 
engage in detail with the specificities of their theories of action, though I do not dispute that 
such an engagement would enrich any and all conclusions I make. 
 
An outline of NieR: Automata 
What is N:A, and why is it a worthy object of discussion with regards to concepts of action 
and ethics in games? The first question may easily and immediately be answered by recourse 
to terminology from popular gaming discourse and factual information. N:A is a single-
player, third-person action role-playing game, directed by Japanese game developer Yoko 
Taro. The game’s diegetic setting is post-apocalyptic Earth in the far future, a battleground 
for an ongoing war fought between, on the one hand, androids in service of humanity, and, on 
the other, machine lifeforms created by alien invaders. The game’s scripted narrative is 
presented linearly, in the form of conversations and cutscenes alongside a series of quests that 
the player undertakes, and centers primarily on the three androids the player gets to control 
during the course of the game – 2B, 9S, and A2. Gameplay-wise, the player of N:A will 
frequently alternate between ”hack and slash” and “shoot ‘em up” combat in various 
modalities, characterized by different cardinalities of play and camera perspectives. Apart 
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from these somewhat idiosyncratic shifts between different modalities of combat, it would at 
first glance seem that the game simply reproduces most of the conventions of the action role-
playing genre. However, prolonged engagement with N:A, both with regards to its ludic and 
its narrative content, casts significant doubt upon this claim and brings us closer to answering 
the second question posed at the start of this paragraph. 
 
Recurrence and closure 
The diegetic world of N:A, inhabited primarily by artificial lifeforms, is replete with 
references to philosophers (Kant, Pascal, Marx, Engels, de Beauvoir, and Hegel, among 
others) and their tenets. One concept, however, stands out as thematically the most 
ubiquitous. Upon first starting the game, the player is greeted by a short speech made by 2B, 
obliquely referencing the idea of eternal recurrence popularized by, and central to the 
writings of, the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (see Nietzsche 1974: 273-274): 
 
Everything that lives is designed to end. We are perpetually trapped… in a never-ending spiral of life 
and death. Is this a curse? Or some kind of punishment? I often think about the god who blessed us 
with this cryptic puzzle… and wonder if we’ll ever have the chance to kill him. (N:A, opening 
speech) 
 
The idea of eternal recurrence prominently features in N:A’s scripted narrative: the current 
android models and their machine opponents are, over the course of the game, revealed to be 
just the latest iteration fighting in a multi-millennial proxy war between humans and alien 
invaders, who have in actuality died out thousands of years prior. Furthermore, the idea in 
question thematically contextualizes the gameplay of N:A. For most of the game, dying in 
combat is systematized in a mechanically similar fashion to the games of the Souls series 
(FromSoftware 2009), with the avatar respawning at the last save point and the player being 
able to collect their lost possessions by returning to the place of their defeat. The new avatars 
granted to the player are described in-game as brand new android bodies, containing the 
saved memories of their predecessor which are stored in servers in the android base in Earth’s 
orbit, uploaded each time the player saves the game. Each gameplay loop from respawn to 
defeat is therefore thematized as a life cycle of a single android in a never-ending series of 
replicated, disposable bodies. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting realization of the Nietzschean concept, however, is not on the 
level of the game’s gameplay or narrative content, but of structure. N:A features not one or 
two, but twenty-six different end-states openly designated as “endings,” one for each letter of 
the English alphabet. Most of the endings are humorous and/or optional – a result of 
consuming a fish to which androids are allergic, or of running away from combat at a crucial 
story moment – but, to witness the entirety of the game’s scripted narrative, the player is 
required to reach all of the first five, successively unlocked endings (A through E). This 
process involves continuing to play past the designated end-states marked by the game’s 
closing credits, sometimes to the extent of replaying significant portions of the game. For 
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example, reaching the B ending is a matter of following the same core narrative events from 
the perspective of the android 9S instead of 2B, with only small narrative additions and 
gameplay alterations. As a result of its highly idiosyncratic narrative structure, N:A 
continually deprives the player of a sense of narrative closure, often simply present in an 
unproblematic fashion in narrative-driven games of the same genre. In a manner resembling 
the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise, that which we could colloquially conceptualize as 
“the ending of the game” is repeatedly moved away from the player the more they are trying 
to reach it, with the game itself beginning anew or unexpectedly continuing at what seem to 
be points of definite closure. 
 
Perspective 
N:A’s structural experimentation complements the game’s problematization of another 
important issue with regards to war, that of perspective. On a strictly ludic level, and as 
mentioned before, combat in the game often shifts from one cardinality and/or camera angle 
to another, giving the impression of playing a multiplicity of different “games” within a 
single game artifact. During the second playthrough, and while in control of 9S, the player 
can also hack into machine lifeforms and control them in combat, further adding to the 
complexity and variety of gameplay. The notion of shifting perspectives is crucial on the 
narrative level, as well, which sees the androids interacting with certain non-violent machine 
lifeforms, only to uncover that the machines as a species are becoming self-aware, struggling 
with existential issues and capable of an uncannily human range of emotions. This idea recurs 
in quest upon quest and interaction upon interaction in N:A, and can be said to form the 
thematic kernel of the game. 
 
Unlike a self-reflexive game about war like Spec Ops: The Line (Yager Development 2012), 
which seeks to directly confront the player with the unethical nature of their ludic actions 
(Murray 2016), N:A tries its best to instill the player with a critical awareness of the sheer 
complexity of conflict by not lionizing or demonizing either of the sides involved. The 
narrative of N:A eschews the simple dichotomy of good and bad often found in single-player 
narrative-driven games in favor of an examination of forces which nourish and propel war, to 
the point of bleakly presenting violence itself as an eternally recurring element of humanity. 
The player is, for the most part, only tangentially implicated as having a role in the violence, 
in the form of addresses and implorations by the machine enemies during certain combat 
scenarios. 
 
Limitation 
The more the player follows the guiding line of the scripted narrative of N:A, the more they 
will discover that violence is an inescapable, practically institutionalized part of the game. 
After reaching the B ending, the player is informed (via a short cinematic trailer) that there is 
yet more to the game’s story, and is instructed to continue playing. The happy conclusions of 
a handful of the game’s earlier quests and the relative narrative closure of its A and B endings 
get progressively undone during the third playthrough of N:A, and are revealed to be 
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temporary stops in the ever-growing android-machine war. By the end of the third 
playthrough, most of the named characters, minor or major, end up dead: most of the 
androids, including 2B, die as a result of a computer virus, the android base and backup 
servers get destroyed, the village of peaceful machines is massacred, the children of the 
village commit mass suicide, and 9S and A2 end up killing one another in their final duel. 
The player has no say in any of these narrative developments – the only explicit choice 
allotted to them is which of the two androids to control in the fight against the other, which 
determines the ending scenario (C or D, with the option to replay the other given afterwards). 
 
If the second playthrough is meant to guide the player to reconsider (and perhaps do away 
with) their value dichotomies with regards to the two opposing factions in the game, the third 
playthrough is meant to shock the player into feeling limited with regards to their repertoire 
of actions in the game. The continual and genre-characteristic improvements on the ludic 
level (more experience points, better equipment, more refined gameplay skills) are sharply 
contrasted by the player’s inability to meaningfully affect narrative events, whose 
progression requires ongoing participation in combat and the indiscriminate killing of 
intelligent and continually humanized androids and machines alike. Via this dichotomy, 
increasingly emphasized throughout the third playthrough, N:A seeks to evoke a feeling of 
tension in the player between ludic ability (and the need to exercise it to progress in the 
game) on the one hand and ethical inability on the other. This ludoethical tension also 
thematically ties into the game’s conceptualization of violence as a fundamental, systemic 
element of humanity, as the continuation of the game’s story quite literally depends on the 
exercise of violence the game as a system requires, regardless of the attitude of the player 
towards it. 
 
What separates N:A from similar games which deliberately strip players of ethical agency is 
the fact that the game eventually provides that agency back, framing it as potential to act 
ethically within the game with real-world consequences. To reach the E ending of the game 
and resurrect the fallen android protagonists, the player will have to take part in a top-down 
“shoot ‘em up” level of the game, piloting a ship and shooting the game’s very end credits in 
a symbolic act of rebellion against the game itself and those involved in creating it. Most of 
the level can be navigated in isolation, but the last third or so is immensely difficult, ensuring 
that the unskilled player will die multiple times. After several deaths, the player is given an 
offer by a random fellow player of the game, via the networking features of N:A; should they 
accept, they will find that help from others makes the level relatively easy to complete. After 
a final narrative scene, which presents the idea that the meaning of life is to be found in the 
struggle within the cycles of violence, the player is given an option to help another fellow 
player, a random stranger somewhere in the world striving for the E ending. The cost of 
choosing to help is the player’s save data, which gets erased should they accept. At no point 
is any of the two choices valorized or touted as correct; the player will choose what they 
think is right for them1. 
                                                 
1 If one is so inclined, they could follow the implications of the game’s opening speech even further and 
interpret the gameplay scenario in question in a Nietzschean modus – after the death of the game’s gods at the 
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This brief description of N:A ought to be sufficient to showcase the game’s worthiness as a 
ludic object of study with regards to issues of ethics and action. In light of its dramatic, 
unusual, possibly ultimate moment of closure, one question logically arises: how does a game 
like N:A get the player to the stage where they would willingly accept to delete their save 
data under the pretense of helping a random fellow player? It is this question, partly 
concerned with player guidance and partly with ethical value formation, that the rest of the 
paper is devoted to answering. 
 
On the possibilities for action in single-player computer games 
To what extent can a single-player computer game define and direct the player’s actions? At 
the most basic of levels, we could examine this issue by talking about game mechanics2. In, 
for example, Grand Theft Auto III (GTA III; DMA Design 2001), the player is able to walk, 
run, jump, punch and shoot a gun, among other actions, throughout most of the game. 
Jumping or falling into a large body of water, however, results in the quick loss of health 
points and the eventual death of the player-controlled character. Put another way, one cannot 
swim in GTA III. Within the context of the game unmodified by third-party programs such as 
trainers or mods, such an action is simply not afforded by the game system. Flying, on the 
other hand, is also a possibility, albeit one requiring a particular vehicle, and more 
importantly, a lot of time and effort to successfully perform. Should the player board the 
Dodo, a small airplane with sawed-off wings found in the last area of the game to be 
unlocked, they will be able to both taxi on the runway and take off into the air, with the 
distance and height of their flight determined by their prowess at controlling the awkward, 
unbalanced aircraft. According to the game developers, the Dodo was “never meant to be 
flown very much at all [...] it was just a fun thing that people then went crazy with when they 
figured out various bugs that let them fly it!” (Anon. [1]). Even though the singular plane in 
the game was never designed as fully functional, the fact remains that the game’s system still 
enables it to fly – in the hands of a skilled player, potentially very far. 
 
The difference between the availability of different actions in the form of mechanics in GTA 
III is illustrative of different ways of understanding, in the most simplest of terms, the active 
relationship between the player and the digital game system. In game studies, this 
relationship has most often been analyzed with regards to the concept of rules, a concept 
which has, throughout the years, been substantially debated and revised by different scholars. 
According to Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman, for example, the chief characteristic of game 
rules, both in computer and non-computer games, is that they limit player behavior – “rules 
                                                                                                                                                       
hands of the player, there is space for moral reevaluation and self-definition (see Nietzsche 1974, 2006). I will 
return to aspects of this interpretation at the very end of the paper. 
2 When talking about this concept, I follow the general definition of Miguel Sicart, who defines game mechanics 
as “methods invoked by agents for interacting with the game world,” methods being “actions the player can take 
within the space of possibility created by the rules” (Sicart 2008). Seeing as there is already a significant overlap 
between the terms mechanic and action in Sicart’s definition, I will use the former in specific instances, when 
talking about those actions formally defined in a particular game system, while reserving the latter as a more 
general term, applicable across different domains of the player-game relationship. 
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are ‘sets of instructions,’ and following those instructions means doing what the rules require 
and not doing something else instead” (Salen & Zimmerman 2003: 122). In “Half-Real,” 
Jesper Juul disputes the exclusively-restrictive view of rules of Salen and Zimmerman, 
arguing that, in addition to prohibiting certain actions within the game, rules “also set up 
potential actions, actions that are meaningful inside the game but meaningless outside” (Juul 
2005: 58, italics original). Juul’s view is echoed by the authors of the Game Ontology 
Project, for whom rules also “define and constrain what can or can’t be done in a game” 
(Zagal et al. 2005: 4). More recently, certain authors, like Chris DeLeon, have insisted that 
rules in computer games fundamentally differ from rules in non-computer games, with the 
former being “more like laws of physics” and the latter “more like laws of society” (DeLeon 
2013: 1). According to DeLeon, the player of a computer game can perform only those 
actions which “constitute valid maneuvers within the game’s construction” (2013: 8). 
DeLeon builds on the argument forwarded by Michael Liebe, who similarly claims that the 
affording function of rules is of paramount importance for understanding the relationship 
between the player and the computer game. For Liebe, without the formally codified rules 
within the software of the game, no action at all would be possible for the player to take: 
 
Action possibilities first have to be provided by the computer game program before they may be 
performed [...] In computer games, the player could not do anything at all if the rules and the game 
space were not defined in the software. [...] So, instead of restricting potential player behavior, the 
computer game rules first of all facilitate or enable possible player actions. (Liebe 2008: 337-338, 
italics original) 
 
Returning for a moment to the example of GTA III, we may say that the player is able to 
walk, punch and run because the game system – the programmed and executable code of the 
computer game in question – has certain formally codified rules which enable these actions to 
be performed by the player in most situations in the form of available game mechanics. 
Similarly, the player is unable to swim because such an action has not been programmed into 
the game system – GTA III does not feature a swimming mechanic. When it comes to flying 
the Dodo airplane, however, the mechanic in question is an interesting outlier. On the one 
hand, the designers of the game, by their own admission, did not intend for or design the 
flying mechanic to be functional. The game certainly does not feature anything close to the 
array of fully-pilotable aircraft implemented in later games in the series. Nevertheless, the 
mechanic is formally defined and present, albeit in an incomplete form, on the level of the 
game’s code. In actual practice, players can fly in GTA III, to varying degrees – the novices 
would only muster rudimentary flight, lasting a few seconds, but those willing to invest time 
and effort honing their skills would be able to fly in a very functional way, across the entirety 
of the virtual game space. From the standpoint of design, flying a plane in GTA III is an 
anomalous, unpolished mechanic, neither truly a bug nor truly a feature, functionally 
available only to those willing to experiment and practice with the Dodo airplane. As such, 
however, it functions as an excellent illustration (on one ontological level, at least) of the not-
always-clear boundary between the restrictive and the affordable natures of the computer 
game system, in the interaction with which there is always room for appropriative play 
behavior (Sicart 2011). 
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The example of the Dodo in GTA III also highlights the limitations of classifying actions in a 
computer game as merely mechanically available or not available in anything but the 
broadest of senses. During the course of playing a particular computer game, the player may 
(and often does) find that certain mechanics are restricted at certain times, as part of a 
scripted sequence of events which forces a particular outcome. At one point in Metal Gear 
Solid (Kojima Computer Entertainment Japan 1998), the player is observing a conversation 
between two characters through the by-then familiar scope of a rocket launcher, able to target 
either of them but unable to actually shoot them. In single-player computer games in 
particular, new mechanics can (and often do) get progressively introduced, changing the 
gameplay experience to a lesser or greater degree. In N:A, only when controlling 9S can the 
player hack into machines and open specific locked chests. Perhaps most importantly, we 
also need to take into account the fact that the validity of actions in computer games is always 
evaluated by the game system itself; in certain cases, the game system may elicit certain 
actions, or combinations of actions, in order for the player to simply continue playing the 
game. With regards to that, and discussing the example of Sim City 4 (Maxis 2003), Olli 
Leino writes:  
 
In the materiality of Sim City 4 the extent of my freedom is defined before I set out to play: some 
kinds of actions and their combinations are possible whereas others are not. [...] That as a 
consequence of certain choices I can fail and be prohibited to continue playing Sim City 4, 
exemplifies that the game resists my actions, and that the notions of “choice”, “success” and “failure” 
are meaningful in the specific context of Sim City 4. (Leino 2009: 11) 
 
Drawing on Bernard Suits’ notion of lusory attitude3, as well as Jean-Paul Sartre’s writings 
on freedom and resistance, Leino refers to the responsible freedom of choice provided by a 
particular game and predicated on the continuation of the gameplay activity as the gameplay 
condition (2009: 12). Given a game-specific scope of choices at a particular moment, as well 
as a desire to prolong the activity of gameplay, the player is responsible for choosing 
correctly in order for gameplay to be able to continue. What is more, this responsibility 
imparts meaning to the actions that the player chooses to take, because the very activity of 
gameplay is at stake in the choosing. In the case of computer games, the player’s choices are 
both provided and evaluated by the game system; if the system interprets an action or a 
combination of actions as incorrect, it may resist them and bring gameplay to a halt. 
Therefore, the computer game system as a whole, with its specific, designed configurations 
and scopes of action (and (if any) implied directions for action), has an essentially normative 
character by virtue of prescribing and delimiting player behavior to a lesser or greater 
degree4. We could rephrase the assumptions behind Leino’s notion of the gameplay condition 
as a prescriptive, normative statement directed to the player: “You may do what you wish 
                                                 
3 Suits defines the lusory attitude as “the acceptance of constitutive rules just so the activity made possible by 
such acceptance can occur” (Suits 1978: 40). 
 4 Along a similar vein, Alexander Galloway talks of computers in general as being “an ethic,” describing general 
principles and methods for their practice to the end-user – in his words, the computer as a machine is an ethic 
“because it is premised on the notion that objects are subject to definition and manipulation according to a set of 
principles for action.” (Galloway 2012: 22, 23, italics original).  
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with what is at your disposal, but your choices should first and foremost always make it 
possible for the gameplay activity to continue”5. 
 
It ought to be said that some scholars have problematized the strict submission to what Leino 
dubs the gameplay condition. In Veli-Matti Karhulahti’s view, the “artifactual performance 
evaluation of the player” (2015a, italics original) can be seen as the identifying property of 
computer games, with successes/wins and failures/losses as subjective attitudes of the player 
towards the different ending states of the game, rather than indisputable factual states which 
come about as a result of player choice. A computer game “evaluates all player performance, 
equally” (Karhulahti 2015b, italics original), and though it can certainly impose criteria for 
reaching a particular end state, the player can always choose whether or not to reach it and 
cannot be forced to feel one way or another about it. For example, repeatedly flaunting the 
gameplay condition can sometimes be enjoyable enough to warrant the trouble of restarting 
gameplay after the system halts the activity. Along a similar line, and from the perspective of 
enactivism, Jukka Vahlo sees the computer game as simply generating affordances for action; 
in such a system, the player’s intention to continue playing the game is under their own 
autonomy, with the game not being able to dictate player behavior (Vahlo 2017). With that in 
mind, perhaps it is best to understand the gameplay condition as a precarious construct that is 
open to challenges and subversions by the player, but one which nevertheless serves to imply 
orientation to the player’s activities. 
 
In addition to a particular scope of affordances for player action, certain games also feature 
explicit goals which serve to more explicitly orient those actions, framing them as part of a 
structure of progression towards a (usually) predefined end state (Juul 2002: 324). In single-
player computer games in particular, structures of progression are often contextualized with 
the aid of various narrative elements (characters, textual narration, cutscenes, scripted events, 
and the like). These narratively-reinforced schemata for ludic behavior can be explicitly 
formalized and labeled as missions, objectives, or quests6, among others, but regardless of the 
form in which they are presented, they provide an opportunity for extrinsically motivated, 
structured, goal-oriented gameplay, and can furthermore be a vehicle for the conveyance of 
scripted narrative content when combined with appropriate spatial design (Aarseth 2005: 9, 
11). 
 
Just because a game features a prescribed structure of progression backed by a scripted 
narrative does not, of course, mean that the player blindly follows it at all times. For example, 
as Leino points out, simply maintaining play within the boundaries of the gameplay condition 
can be enjoyable enough for players to continue the activity of gameplay, regardless of 
                                                 
 5 In a later paper, Leino himself seems to hint at the normative aspects of computer game systems by stating 
that, while interacting with them, “the player appears as being subjected to the gameplay condition” (Leino 
2012: 70, italics original).  
6 Espen Aarseth subsumes all of the labels in question under the heading of quests; in addition, Aarseth views 
the quest as a more general structure in games, one which may not necessarily involve narrative adornment 
(Aarseth 2005: 2). 
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whether or not the player is striving for any goals (Leino 2009: 12-13)7. How, then, are we to 
reconcile the scripted (narratives, but also goal-oriented structures) and the unscripted (player 
behavior, motivations for play) factors which need to be considered when talking about the 
possibilities for action in single-player computer games? 
 
Drawing on the writings of Roger Caillois and the structuralist narrative terminology of 
Roland Barthes (in particular the concepts of cardinal functions  and catalysers8) Hans-
Joachim Backe presents a three-layered model of computer games which can help account for 
both rigid narrative content and a possibility space for varying kinds of play behavior in 
games. According to Backe, we can conceptualize games as having three different structural 
levels – substructural, microstructural and macrostructural (Backe 2012: 254). The 
substructural level is a venue for “unstructured, aimless play” (2012: 252), for intrinsically 
motivated experimentation and exploration, which “constitutes the game’s events and the 
catalysers of its fabula” (2012: 254). The microstructural level is characterized by structured 
play, in the form of formalized challenges with achievable goals which “act as cardinal 
functions on a narrative level by identifying singular, meaningful situations with potentially 
relevant outcomes” (Backe 2012: 254). Finally, the microstructural events are connected into 
a meaningful whole on the macrostructural level. Macrostructure is especially relevant when 
talking about single-player games because it introduces the concept of an achievable ending 
to the game in the form of a final challenge, which in turn imparts meaning to the actions and 
events which take place in progression towards it and a sense of closure upon reaching it – in 
Backe’s words, “the existence of a final challenge indicates consequentiality and cohesion” 
(2012: 253). Of course, speaking strictly in terms of gameplay, overcoming the final 
challenge in a game (however that challenge may be formalized and presented to the player) 
hardly ever signals that the game is “finished” in any appreciable way9. In addition, the 
player need not play a game for its macrostructure, so to speak, at any or even all times – they 
may simply enjoy the experimentation and unstructured play on the substructural level, or the 
occasional microstructural challenge in isolation. Still, in the case of games which have a 
scripted narrative, the macrostructure implies a more-or-less definite end state towards which 
the player can and should orient their actions, a point at which the game’s story, at least, will 
come to some sort of definite halt. 
 
At this point, we can return to N:A and shortly discuss how it specifically limits and guides 
the player. N:A presents the player with a fixed set of predominantly combat-oriented 
                                                 
7  Vahlo qualifies this view by saying that if the game does not generate “changes that emerge for the player as 
novel affordances for exploration and continuation” over time in some form, “the game artifact will deprive the 
self-sustaining autonomy of gameplay instead of nourishing it” (2017). Still, Leino’s point is more than valid, as 
it helps explain the frequent phenomenon of prolonged unstructured engagement with a game even in cases 
when all its affordances have been revealed to the player. 
8 Cardinal functions are “the nuclei of stories,” their constituent parts – they are connected by a “logic of 
consequence” and form the narrative framework – while catalysers are supplementary events which afford 
“coherence and verisimilitude by fleshing out actions, yet which are not crucial and could be omitted or changed 
without significantly altering the story” (Backe 2012: 246). 
9 The concepts of replayability, post-game, and New Game +, among others, are particularly relevant with 
regards to this, especially with the current prevalence of downloadable content, expansion packs and third-party 
mods for single-player games.  
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mechanics and systems of skill and attribute progression characteristic in the genre of role-
playing games. Additionally, the game includes microstructures in the form of narratively-
adorned quests and linear combat scenarios in varied, but scripted modalities. Most 
importantly, however, N:A features a highly idiosyncratic macrostructure, complete with 
multiple points designated as endings, as part of which narrative closure is continually 
deferred. The game’s macrostructure, with its “false,” often humorous endings and explicit 
announcements to the player that there is “more to the game,” can be regarded as 
purposefully intriguing, aimed at not only guiding player behavior in the direction of the 
ever-shifting narrative end-point, but also making the player engage with the game’s 
narrative content and ethical themes, brought to the fore all the more because of the unusual 
way in which they are presented. 
 
On ethics in single-player computer games 
Another way to conceive of macrostructure is as a guiding element which helps in the 
construction of what Espen Aarseth, following the narratological notion of the implied reader 
popularized by Wolfgang Iser, has dubbed the implied player (Aarseth 2007). Aarseth 
describes the implied player as “a role made for the player by the game, a set of expectations 
that the player must fulfill for the game to ‘exercise its effect’,” noting that these are 
expectations for, specifically, player behavior, “a limitation to the playing person’s freedom 
of movement and choice” (2007: 132). Much like the implied reader, the implied player is a 
construct whose elements can be traced to the structure of the game; the actual player fulfills 
the role to a lesser or greater degree. With that in mind, we could combine Aarseth’s notion 
of the implied player with Backe’s three structural levels, and talk about the different implied 
player criteria in a single-player computer game. For the activity of gameplay to be able to 
occur on the most basic of levels (the substructural level), the player is presumed to be 
willing and able to interact with the hardware and software required for running the game. In 
the case of N:A, much like with many other computer games, this includes the ability to use 
either a controller or a mouse-keyboard setup, as well as the ability to operate the game 
software itself. On the microstructural level, the player is presumed to be willing and able to 
take part in, and complete, goal-oriented ludic schemas such as quests. Finally, on the 
macrostructural level, the player is presumed to be willing and able to follow the game’s 
macrostructure to the end. In N:A, this entails completing the relatively lengthy main 
sequence of quests, improving the player’s avatar’s attributes, and continuing to play past 
points of incomplete narrative closure (the A and B endings, for example). We could expand 
this conceptualization by including certain personality traits which act as preconditions for 
prolonged engagement with, specifically, N:A – namely, an enjoyment of the forms of 
gameplay on offer in the game, as well as appreciation for (or at the very least, tolerance of) 
the game’s aesthetic sensibilities. This list is by no means meant to be definitive and 
definitional even for N:A, let alone any category of games, but is simply used to illustrate 
some of the (arguably many) criteria behind the notion of the implied player. 
 
To what extent, though, can we talk about ethical and moral values in relation to the notion of 
the implied player? Speaking in broad terms and on the most fundamental of levels, for a 
player to play a computer game, their values must obviously be flexible enough to allow for 
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specific ludic acts to be committed, otherwise there would be no player behavior to begin 
with. In N:A, this includes a basic willingness to slash and shoot machines and androids into 
their constituent pieces of metal. On the other hand, specific ethical and moral values are in 
no way a formal requirement for implied player behavior in a game like N:A – one could 
exhaust the game’s scripted narrative, reach the E ending, and delete or not delete their save 
data without once considering ethical issues at play in the game. The game system has no 
way of knowing, let alone judging, the personal values and beliefs of the player; it judges 
actions as such, not any justification behind them10. Therefore, just because a game can, to a 
lesser or greater degree, construct its implied player via formal strictures does not necessarily 
mean that those strictures foster certain ethical or moral values. Consequently, we could ask – 
what, if anything, does foster them? 
 
As Miguel Sicart has pointed out, playing a computer game does not automatically entail a 
transmission of particular values because the game is encountered, and the gameplay 
experience realized by, the individual player who has their own set of values and is crucially 
able to reflect on the ethical content of the game, including their own actions during the 
gameplay experience (Sicart 2009: 146-147). Drawing the concept of the hermeneutic circle 
put forth by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Sicart puts forward a model of ethical interpretation of 
games which he calls the ludic hermenutic circle, a “layered interpretational moral process, 
which starts with the becoming of the player and goes through a series of interpretative stages 
that conclude in the development of the ludic phronesis” (2009: 118). According to Sicart’s 
model, the person playing a particular game is first constituted by it as a specific player-
subject, conditioned by the affordances and constraints of the game system and bound by it in 
action. The moral being behind that player-subject (i.e. the individual player) is then able to 
reflect on the relationship between that particular game system and the player-subject it is 
creating – in other words, on the “act of being committed to the power structure of the game” 
(Sicart 2009: 119). This dialogic reflection is aided by the player’s previous gaming 
experiences and the practical moral and ethical knowledge originating from said experiences, 
which Sicart dubs the ludic phronesis. The player’s ethical interpretation is further 
conditioned by two other important factors not related to the game system: influences 
stemming from their involvement in a wider player community, and, of course, their own 
personal values as moral, cultural, embodied beings external to the game. Each process of 
ethical interpretation further hones the player’s ludic phronesis and, through time, leads to 
ludic moral maturation. The ludic hermeneutic circle model enables us to conceptualize of 
the ethics of the player in a processual manner, as fundamentally constructed and refined 
iteratively, through gameplay experiences which frame the player as a conditioned player-
subject and reflections upon said experiences, both in isolation and with others. 
                                                 
10 With regards to this, Miguel Sicart has proposed the concept of ethical gameplay as “ludic experiences in 
which regulation, mediation and goals require from the player moral reflection beyond the calculation of 
statistics and possibilities” (2013: 24, italics original). But, to what extent can we talk about moral reflection as 
a requirement of ludic experiences, if the very concept of reflection presupposes a post facto process – and if, as 
I have posited above, specific ethical and moral values cannot be formally required by the game system at all? 
For ethical gameplay experiences to happen, there must first be gameplay as such. The player’s allegiance is, 
first and foremost, to the game – otherwise, they would not be a player at all. None of this is to say that 
computer games cannot inspire ethical reflection in the player, only that said reflection is by default a process of 
higher-level engagement arising from gameplay (an implication made by Sicart himself and noted later in the 
paper). 
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Sicart’s understanding of a good ethical player is based on the Aristotelian framework of 
virtue ethics, with virtue in relation to computer games being defined as “the capacity for a 
player-subject to make a gameplay choice informed by her practical wisdom and 
understanding, taking into account her membership in a player community and her self 
outside the game” (2009: 92-93). Though Sicart presents a list of virtues which players 
should have and which improve through practice (including a sense of achievement, 
explorative curiosity, and balanced aggression, among others (2009: 103)), these virtues are 
not an absolute given for any player, in particular when it comes to single-player computer 
games in which a player may choose their own virtues and play accordingly (see Karhulahti 
2016). The extent to which a particular game may trigger the ludic hermeneutic interpretative 
circle and inspire a particular ethical approach to gameplay depends on its design, and even 
in the case of games which feature a closed system of ethical values to which the player 
needs to adapt (Sicart 2009: 215), the design of the game can only do so much to encourage 
or discourage particular values because of the specific value makeup of the individual in 
question who is playing the game. 
 
How, then, can we understand the process of ethical interpretation and, possibly, value 
formation with regards to games? Expanding on the ideas of Aarseth and Sicart, we may talk 
about the implied being of a particular game as an ideal construct in relation to ethical and 
moral values. While the notion of the implied player comprises a set of expectations for 
behavior, the notion of the implied being includes a set of engagement criteria expected of 
the moral, cultural, embodied being interacting with the game and the values on offer therein. 
These values can be interpellated and negotiated not necessarily in gameplay, but rather from 
gameplay, during moments of reflection inspired by gameplay experiences and subsequent 
interaction with the wider player community. Much like in the case of the implied player, the 
actual being behind the game can fulfill the implied being criteria to a lesser or greater 
degree, with their complexity varying from game to game; in some cases, such as highly 
abstract games like Tetris (Alexey Pazhitnov & Vladimir Pokhilko 1986), the implied being 
criteria may not exist at all because the game presents no interpretable ethical and moral 
values to begin with11. The implied being is thus a complementary, not necessarily correlative 
concept to the notion of the implied player, but one which can nevertheless be very useful 
when talking about games which explicitly deal with ethical and moral values, especially in 
cases when the player is expected to adopt these. 
 
If we now return to N:A, we can try and conceptualize its idea of the implied being 
interacting with the game. On the most fundamental level, the implied being of N:A is willing 
and able to interpret the game’s extra-ludic content, including its themes and narrative 
elements such as characters and plot lines, in light of moral and ethical values presented 
therein. This is the first precondition for the initiation of the ludic hermeneutic circle of 
ethical interpretation. Furthermore, the implied being of N:A is willing and able to actively 
engage with the intriguing nature of the game’s macrostructure, as well as its unorthodox 
                                                 
11 Needless to say, this does not necessarily preclude the formation of value interpretations. 
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thematic and philosophical content. This engagement may often include discussing the game 
with other players in an effort to fill in the game’s narrative and thematic gaps, a move which 
may foster awareness of a wider player community and thus influence the decision made 
upon reaching the E ending of the game. Finally, the implied being of N:A is willing and able 
to consider and evaluate their own ethical and moral values and those presented in the game 
in relation to their own existence as player-subjects conditioned by the game’s always-
already normative gameplay condition and implied player criteria. This particular point 
represents what is arguably the final stage in N:A’s construction of the implied being behind 
the game; what is more, it enables us to finally answer the driving question behind this paper. 
 
If N:A does indeed evoke a feeling of tension in the player, it is because it exposes them to 
two diametrically opposing roles, forcing the player who fulfills both of those roles into a 
balancing act. On the one hand, the game implies a player who will follow its scripted 
narrative through to the end, behaving in the way required to progress through the game’s 
macrostructure. On the other hand, the game implies a being who will engage with the 
game’s problematization of violence – its presentation of violent acts as institutionalized, 
self-replicating, and dehumanizing to both the agent and the target – and understand their 
limitations and involvement with regards to violence committed in the game. The player of 
N:A is instructed to continue playing, because there always seems to be more to the game and 
its narrative; the human being interacting with N:A is continually told, implicitly or explicitly, 
to stop playing, because the very actions required to reveal more of the game’s 
macrostructure are the ones that the game problematizes from an ethical standpoint. The 
difference between the implied player and the implied being in N:A is thus a matter of 
teleology: in their ideal forms, the former will seek the colloquially understood “true ending 
of the game” and disregard the “false” points of closure, while the latter will essentially not 
want to be the player of the game because their ethical and moral values outweigh their 
acceptance of the player-subjectivity constituted by the game. For those who fulfill the roles 
of both the implied player and the implied being, the very act of playing N:A progressively 
turns into a struggle which threatens to collapse the activity of gameplay itself, a struggle 
which is thematically echoed in the closing moments of the game’s scripted narrative. 
 
The choice offered in N:A as part of the game’s E ending can thus be understood as an 
existential test, a chance for the struggling person playing the game to, as Sartre puts it, 
“make himself by choosing his own morality” (2007: 46). From this perspective, the choice 
concerns not so much the existence of the player-subject in any objective way (because, of 
course, there are ways to “cheat the system,” to back up the save data, to restart the game and 
once again be its player-subject), but rather the nature of the embodied being behind it, given 
at last the chance to define their own essence in relation to the game, to perhaps “stop 
continuing” once and for all. In hindsight, of course, this option was always there, though 
only hinted at by previous points of closure in the form of one of the other twenty-five 
endings. To return to Sartre, we may say that the embodied being interacting with N:A was 
always free to choose to stop being the player of N:A, but for this action to have been 
performed at all, there needed to be an awareness of a fundamental lack in the state of being 
the player, and of a new desirable potentiality in a different state, that of not being the player. 
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“Every action,” writes Sartre, “has for its express condition not only the discovery of a state 
of affairs as ‘lacking in ------,’ […] but also, and before all else, the constitution of the state 
of things under consideration into an isolated system” (1978: 436). Perhaps therein lies the 
explanation for the game’s idiosyncratic macrostructure with regards to the implied being it is 
trying to construct: to escape from the prison of the game, the game must first continue long 
enough to be interpreted as a prison. 
 
Conclusion 
Games like N:A present many challenges not just to us as players, but as scholars of computer 
games, testing the limits of our vocabulary and stretching our established concepts and 
discourses. My argument in this paper was twofold. Firstly, the discussion of the game itself 
was meant to abstract its being into a necessarily limited set of core ideas with which to 
illustrate the ways in which the game problematizes ethics and action in the context of single-
player computer games. Secondly, the examination of the theoretical framework with regards 
to these issues was meant to showcase the fact that we are still insufficiently well-equipped 
for analyzing value-charged games such as N:A. With that in mind, I also tried to somewhat 
amend the situation by explicating the concept of the implied being, which, in tandem with 
the existing theoretical framework, could potentially be used to analyze and talk about these 
games in greater detail. The concept is here offered in its preliminary form; any further 
theoretical engagement, as well as wider application to different games and game types, will 
test its validity. Regardless of the results, the claim behind the concept – that new analytical 
tools and perspectives are needed for analytical inquiry into games like N:A – seems to me to 
be very much valid and in need of addressing. 
 
Games 
DEMON’S SOULS. FromSoftware, PlayStation 3, 2009. 
GRAND THEFT AUTO III. DMA Design, PlayStation 2, 2001. 
METAL GEAR SOLID. Konami Computer Entertainment Japan, PlayStation, 1998. 
NIER: AUTOMATA. PlatinumGames, PlayStation 4, 2017. 
SIM CITY 4. Maxis, PC, 2003. 
SPEC OPS: THE LINE. Yager Development, PC, 2012. 
TETRIS. Alexey Pazhitnov & Vladimir Pokhilko, MS-DOS, 1986. 
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